Publications (referred journals)
Social Image Concerns and Reference Point Formation
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
This paper develops an axiomatic context-dependent model of social image concerns. Allowing for context-dependence based on choice sets, it examines how context-dependence impacts social image concerns, in particular how a decision maker exhibits various social emotions stemming from their intrinsic reference point, which may not be captured by conforming to social norms. To elicit the intrinsic reference point, this paper provides weaker versions of Strategic Rationality and Independence, in addition to the basic axioms, to characterize the model of the Reference-Dependent Image-Conscious utilitarian. This paper also examines how social emotions stemming from the intrinsic reference point are related to preference reversals as violations of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP). Finally, this paper considers the relationship between social image concerns and intrinsic reciprocity. The findings demonstrate that social image plays a large role and the model developed illustrates a condition in which cooperation is sustained in prisoner's dilemma games.
Idea & Approach
- We characterize a reference-dependent image-conscious behavior stemming from an endogenous reference point.
- axiomatic approach - preferences over menus
- We elicit reference-dependent social emotions from image concerns (pride, shame, temptation, regret, spite, etc.).
- Violations of WARP can occur.
- Our model capture image-conscious behavior beyond conforming to social norms.
- Social emotions stemming from social image can lead to reciprocal preferences. We study a cooperation under a one-shot Prisoner’s Dilemma game with a simple setting.
The left icon links the accepted version of paper (Google drive).
Stochastic Expected Inequity-Averse Choice (with Keisuke Yoshihara)
This note studies stochastic inequity-averse choice behavior, capturing ex-post fairness and ex-ante fairness. By studying deliberate randomization, we characterize the stochastic choice behavior stemming from Saito [Social Preferences under Risk: Equality of Opportunity versus Equality of Outcome, American Economic Review, 103 (7): 3084-3101]. We find that the violations of first order stochastic dominance (FOSD) and Regularity occur, and that ex-ante fairness can lead to preference reversal phenomena.
The file is linked to Google drive.
Idea & Approach.
- We study deliberately stochastic choice behavior stemming from Saito (2013).
- axiomatic approach - preferences over lotteries & stochastic choice function
- Stochastic Expected Inequity-Averse Choice is not consistent with Regularity.
- Violations of WARP and FOSD can occur.
- Stochastic EIA does not nest Additive Perturbed Inequity-Averse Utility (APU(IA)).