Comments.
  • I wrote a companion paper: "Social Preferences and Cooperation: A Theoretical Analysis."
Abstract.
In this study, we develop a framework to incorporate social preferences such as outcome-based social preferences, reciprocity, and social concerns into strategic interactions. We introduce a new equilibrium concept that is an extended version of Nash equilibria and study the one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD). The framework has the two components to understand sustaining cooperation: (1) the payoff structure of the objectively given game, which is related to outcome-based social preferences, and (2) the belief structure among players, which is related to reciprocity and social concerns. We examine how cooperation in the one-shot PD is related to social preferences. We then state the conditions consistent with the experimental evidence of the one-shot PD. Finally, we apply our framework into trust games to study betrayal aversion in terms of social preferences with uncertainty-averse beliefs.
Link. 
The link to SSRN is here.
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Overview.
Purpose. 
  • 社会的選好と戦略的相互依存性を組み入れたゲーム理論的分析をする理論枠組みを提示しています．
  • outcome-based な社会的選好として utilitarian の選好を仮定し (考察として不衡平回避性の選好を検討)，相手の利己性/利他性の程度を予想する戦略的不確実性に対して，不確実性回避性，互恵性，image concern 等を導入しています．
​Methodology. 
  • theory - equilibrium analysis
Findings. 
  • 本研究の枠組みを1回限りの囚人のジレンマに応用し，メタ分析と整合的な条件を整理しています．outcome-based な社会的選好による特徴づけをしています．
  • 下記の文献を主に参照しています:
    1. Mengel [Mengel, F. (2018). Risk and Temptation: A Meta‐study on Prisoner's Dilemma Games. The Economic Journal, 128(616), 3182-3209.], 
    2. Ahn et al.  [Ahn, T. K., Ostrom, E., Schmidt, D., Shupp, R., and Walker, J. (2001): ``Cooperation in PD Fames: Fear, Greed, and History of Play,'' Public Choice, 106(1-2), 137-155.] and 
    3. Charness et al. [Charness, G., Rigotti, L., and Rustichini, A. (2016): ``Social Surplus Determines Cooperation Rates in the One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma,'' Games and Economic Behavior, 100, 113-124.].​​
  • 互恵的な信念と協力率の関係，image concern が協力率に与える影響を考察しています．
Implications. 
  • Trust Game の betrayal aversion について，不確実性回避的な信念を持つ truster ほど起こりやすいことを説明しています．