Social Preferences and Strategic Interaction: A Revealed Preference Approach
I wrote a companion paper: "Social Preferences and Cooperation: A Theoretical Analysis."
In this study, we develop a framework to incorporate social preferences such as outcome-based social preferences, reciprocity, and social concerns into strategic interactions. We introduce a new equilibrium concept that is an extended version of Nash equilibria and study the one-shot prisoner's dilemma (PD). The framework has the two components to understand sustaining cooperation: (1) the payoff structure of the objectively given game, which is related to outcome-based social preferences, and (2) the belief structure among players, which is related to reciprocity and social concerns. We examine how cooperation in the one-shot PD is related to social preferences. We then state the conditions consistent with the experimental evidence of the one-shot PD. Finally, we apply our framework into trust games to study betrayal aversion in terms of social preferences with uncertainty-averse beliefs.
Mengel [Mengel, F. (2018). Risk and Temptation: A Meta‐study on Prisoner's Dilemma Games. The Economic Journal, 128(616), 3182-3209.],
Ahn et al. [Ahn, T. K., Ostrom, E., Schmidt, D., Shupp, R., and Walker, J. (2001): ``Cooperation in PD Fames: Fear, Greed, and History of Play,'' Public Choice, 106(1-2), 137-155.] and
Charness et al. [Charness, G., Rigotti, L., and Rustichini, A. (2016): ``Social Surplus Determines Cooperation Rates in the One-Shot Prisoner's Dilemma,'' Games and Economic Behavior, 100, 113-124.].
互恵的な信念と協力率の関係，image concern が協力率に与える影響を考察しています．
Trust Game の betrayal aversion について，不確実性回避的な信念を持つ truster ほど起こりやすいことを説明しています．